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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Edward Coss ("Coss" or "appellant") urges us to reverse 
the District Court's denial of his motion for habeas corpus 
relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. Coss argues that 
his counsel's failure to subpoena certain witnesses to testify 
at his trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and 
that the District Court erred in failing to so rule. For the 
reasons stated below, we will reverse the District Court's 
denial of Coss' ineffective assistance claim and remand to 
the District Court to issue a conditional writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
I. Facts1 
 
On June 25, 1986, Coss, aged 17, attended a party at the 
home of his sister, Carol Ann Frank. Also in attendance 
were Coss' brothers, Jimmy and Bobby, Coss' girlfriend, 
Sherry Kulick, Carol Ann's roommate, Lisa Frieto, and 
Lisa's brother, George Frieto. Most of the guests at the 
party consumed alcohol. During the course of the party, an 
argument started between Sherry and Lisa, and thereafter, 
caused other arguments to erupt among the other guests. 
These arguments caused Carol Ann to throw everyone out 
of her house. Arguments continued outside of Carol Ann's 
house, including one between Jimmy, who was holding a 
baseball bat, and Coss. As a result of all the noise, Carol 
Ann's landlord called the police. The police arrived at the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although at his trial Coss' story differed from the facts we recount 
here, the District Court clearly credited this version of events, as does 
Coss implicitly by the very filing of his motion. 
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scene and tried to quell the fights that had developed on 
Carol Ann's front lawn. Coss was arrested for disorderly 
conduct and taken to police headquarters. 
 
That night, Coss was held in the Lackawanna County 
Detention Facility for underage drinking. Coss damaged the 
cell in which he was placed and was ultimately charged 
with institutional vandalism, criminal mischief, criminal 
trespass, simple assault, theft by unlawful taking or 
disposition, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, terroristic 
threats, and disorderly conduct. 
 
Coss met with his assigned attorney, RoseAnn McGowan, 
two times before his trial. The District Court made the 
finding of fact that Coss gave McGowan the names and 
addresses of several potential witnesses during their first 
meeting.2 Counsel gave Coss no notice of the trial date but 
contacted him approximately one hour before the trial was 
to begin, at which point Coss drove directly to the 
courthouse, stopping only to pick up his brother Jimmy at 
school. 
 
Coss' trial began on October 30, 1986 and lasted two 
days. At the trial, the officers who arrested Coss, Officers 
Adamitis and Wrobel, testified that when they arrived at the 
scene, individuals began scattering and that they grabbed 
Coss as he was running to his car. They testified that Coss 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Coss testified at the evidentiary hearing that in the first meeting, he 
and McGowan discussed "the whole entire story, how it happened, [and] 
who was involved." Coss' second and final meeting with McGowan prior 
to his trial occurred after a severance motion, requesting that the 
charges in connection with the simple assault be severed from those filed 
for the damage to the juvenile detention center, wasfiled in September 
1986. Coss alleges that he and McGowan also discussed the names of 
possible witnesses at this meeting. McGowan did not testify regarding 
her version of what occurred at these meetings. She did testify at the 
evidentiary hearing that Coss did not give her the names of any 
witnesses he wanted her to subpoena, but then admitted that she did 
not specifically remember Coss' case and was instead testifying based on 
her general practice as a public defender. 
 
The court also noted that, even if Coss did not provide the names to 
McGowan at this time, a cursory review of the police reports would have 
identified the names and addresses of some of these witnesses. 
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was screaming vulgarities and smelled of alcohol. They 
testified that, after being grabbed, Coss began pushing 
Officer Wrobel and was then arrested. They also testified 
that as Officer Adamitis attempted to grab Coss' brother 
Bobby, Coss punched Officer Adamitis in the face. This 
punch is the basis for Coss' simple assault charge, which 
is the charge at issue in this appeal. Finally, Officer Wrobel 
testified that an individual named George also hindered 
their attempts to arrest Bobby. 
 
The only witnesses to testify on Coss' behalf were Coss 
and Jimmy.3 They testified that, on the night in question, 
they were in their sister's driveway, along with their brother 
Bobby, and had been there no more than fifteen minutes 
when two police officers arrived and began to assault Bobby 
and Coss. Coss stated that there was no party at Carol 
Ann's house that night, that he had not been drinking, that 
he did not curse or punch anyone, and that he did not 
know who the officer was referring to when he stated that 
an individual named George was at the scene. Jimmy 
corroborated this story, stating that there was no party at 
Carol Ann's, that they were only at Carol Ann's house to 
give her a camera, that he had not been drinking, and that 
Coss did not hit a police officer. 
 
The charges ultimately presented to the jury were 
institutional vandalism and criminal mischief, simple 
assault, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The jury 
convicted Coss of institutional vandalism, criminal 
mischief, and simple assault.4 Coss was sentenced on 
January 30, 1987, receiving six months to one year on the 
simple assault charge and six months to one year on the 
institutional vandalism charge. The simple assault and 
institutional vandalism/criminal mischief sentences ran 
consecutively. Coss has already served his sentence for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. McGowan did not suggest that Jimmy testify. Instead, Coss, on his 
own initiative, brought Jimmy to the trial and asked him to testify. 
McGowan admitted that she never subpoenaed, interviewed, or prepared 
Jimmy. 
 
4. The institutional vandalism and criminal mischief result from Coss' 
destruction of the detention cell and are not related to Coss' interaction 
with the police outside of Carol Ann's house. 
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these convictions. Presently, he is serving a sentence based 
on charges from a 1990 conviction, unrelated to his 1986 
convictions. Although he has served the term for the 
assault charge, Coss urges that his claim is not moot 
because the assault charge was used to enhance the 
sentence from a 1990 conviction for which he is still being 
punished. 
 
II. Procedural Posture 
 
On September 15, 1994, Coss filed a pro se petition for 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to S 2254. Cossfiled an 
amended petition on November 29, 1995, and a Second 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 7, 1996. In 
the petition, Coss claimed that he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel based 
on, among other things, counsel's failure to subpoena any 
of the witnesses he requested.5 
 
On April 20, 1998, an evidentiary hearing was held to 
address Coss' ineffective assistance of counsel claims. At 
the hearing, each of the witnesses that Coss stated he had 
identified to counsel, namely, Carol Ann, Bobby, Sherry, 
and George, testified that McGowan never contacted them 
regarding Coss' trial and that Coss did not strike any police 
officer. Bobby, Sherry, and George testified that the first 
thing that the police did upon arrival was approach Coss 
and place him in the back of one of the police cars. They 
testified that the police then chased after Bobby, at which 
point George jumped on the back of one of the officers to 
try to hinder his attempt to arrest Bobby. Thus, according 
to these witnesses' testimony, Coss was in the police car 
the entire time the police attempted to arrest Bobby. 
According to the District Court, "McGowan's recollection of 
the case [at the evidentiary hearing] was somewhat sketchy."6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Coss also alleged that his counsel was ineffective for empaneling two 
jurors adverse to Coss' interests, failing to have the institutional 
vandalism and criminal mischief charges dismissed, and failing to file 
post-trial motions. The District Court dismissed these other bases of 
ineffective counsel and Coss does not appeal their dismissal. 
 
6. From a review of the evidentiary hearing transcript, we agree with the 
District Court's characterization of McGowan's memory of this case. 
McGowan was asked the following at the evidentiary hearing: 
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She conceded during the hearing that she did not 
investigate the events surrounding Coss' arrest, electing not 
to dispatch her investigator to interview any of the 
witnesses at issue, and defended her actions by stating that 
"Coss must have told her not to subpoena them." Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 16 (June 10, 1998). 
 
Following the hearing, the District Court denied Coss' 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court held 
that, although McGowan's failure to subpoena these 
witnesses "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness," Coss failed to prove that he was 
prejudiced by McGowan's failure because the verdict would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        Q. Ms. McGowan, is your testimony, today, base d on actual 
       recollection of this particular case, the Coss case, or are you 
       testifying, based upon your general practice, as a Public Defender, 
       when you were employed in the Public Defender's Office? 
 
        A. It would -- it would be in part, yes, and  in part, no. Because 
       certain portions that I've responded to, I have direct 
recollection. As 
       I said, I have direct recollection -- once I looked at the 
sentencing 
       report, I had direct recollection, exactly, what had transpired. I 
       mean, once Mr. Coss told Judge Cottone, according to the 
       transcript, that he was thinking about an appeal, but they were 
       telling him this, and then I just -- I recalled. I do recall 
distinctly, 
       exactly, that they -- the they . . was advising him this way, and 
he 
       would not listen to me, okay? When we wanted tofile the Post-trial 
       Motions on that, he did not want them. . . . That is direct 
       recollection. Now, the other stuff may be general. 
 
       . . . . 
 
        Q. Ms. McGowan, what I'm asking you about is, do you, 
       specifically, remember having this conversation with Eddie Coss 
       about these witnesses or is your testimony that this is how you 
       normally conduct yourself? 
 
        A. No, no. No, no, no, it wouldn't be. I would  have asked him 
       what about these people, what about these, what about these? You 
       know, what were they doing there or how are they related to this? 
 
This questioning proceeds, with McGowan answering the questions 
regarding her failure to subpoena the witnesses in the form of what she 
"would have" done or what Coss "must have" said, as opposed to telling 
the court what she "did" or what Coss "said." 
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not have been different given the inconsistency in the 
accounts told by Coss and his brother on the one hand, 
and the witnesses and the police on the other. Coss appeals 
this decision of the District Court, arguing on appeal that 
the District Court erred in its application of the prejudice 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test as stated 
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 
III. Jurisdiction 
 
Before proceeding to the merits of Coss' ineffective 
counsel claim, we will first review whether the District 
Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas 
petition. Section 2254 confers jurisdiction on United States 
district courts to entertain petitions for habeas corpus relief 
only from persons who are "in custody" in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted S 2254 as mandating that 
the petitioner be "in custody" pursuant to the conviction or 
sentence he seeks to attack at the time his petition is filed. 
See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). A habeas 
petitioner does not remain "in custody" under a conviction 
"after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely 
because of the possibility that the prior conviction will be 
used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent 
crimes of which he is convicted." Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 
488, 492 (1989) (per curiam). A petitioner does, however, 
satisfy the "in custody" requirement for federal habeas 
jurisdiction when he asserts a challenge to a sentence he is 
currently serving that has been enhanced by the allegedly 
invalid prior conviction. Id. at 493. Moreover, in United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), the Supreme Court 
held that a prisoner could attack in a federal habeas 
proceeding an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, even if 
he has served in entirety the sentence resulting from the 
conviction, if that conviction had an effect on a present 
sentence. See also Young v. Vaughn, 83 F.3d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 
1996) (holding that "a prisoner may attack his current 
sentence by a habeas challenge to the constitutionality of 
an expired conviction if that conviction was used to 
enhance his current sentence"). 
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In this case, although Coss has already served the 
sentence resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional 1986 
convictions, he is currently serving a sentence for an 
unrelated, 1990 conviction in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Lackawanna County for aggravated assault. Coss alleges 
that the sentence from his 1990 conviction was adversely 
affected by the 1986 assault conviction. The sentencing 
judge did, in fact, refer to Coss' 1986 conviction for 
assaulting a police officer in sentencing him to the top of 
the standard range for his 1990 conviction. Coss is thus 
attacking his prior conviction in an attempt to have his 
current sentence, which relied on his prior conviction, 
reevaluated. The District Court therefore appropriately 
construed Coss' petition as challenging the 1990 conviction 
for aggravated assault rather than his expired conviction, 
see id. at 73, and properly concluded that it had 
jurisdiction over his S 2254 motion petition. Id. We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 & 
2253. 
 
IV. Exhaustion 
 
Absent a valid excuse, a habeas petitioner must present 
all federal claims to the state courts. 28 U.S.C.S 2254(b); 
see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). "The 
exhaustion requirement ensures that state courts have the 
first opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges 
to state convictions and preserves the role of the state 
courts in protecting federally guaranteed rights." Evans v. 
Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, Pa., 959 F.2d 
1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing O'Halloran v. Ryan, 835 
F.2d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 1987)). Of course, "[i]nexcusable or 
inordinate delay by the state in processing claims for relief 
may render the state remedy effectively unavailable" and 
exhaustion will be excused. Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 
353, 354 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
Prior to filing his S 2254 petition, Coss had a petition 
challenging his 1986 conviction pending under 
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 9541, et seq. (amended 1988), for 
approximately seven years without any activity. Under 
these circumstances, the District Court excused the 
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exhaustion requirement and we can find no fault with that 
determination. Appellant has not, however, presented to the 
Pennsylvania state courts his claim that the invalid 1986 
conviction was used to enhance his subsequent conviction 
in 1990, the conviction being challenged by the underlying 
habeas petition. Nonetheless, we conclude that this is not 
a situation in which the District Court was faced with a 
mixed petition necessitating a dismissal under Rose v. 
Lundy. As was made clear by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718 (1997), 
collateral relief is not available under either the Post 
Conviction Hearing Act or under the common law remedies 
of state habeas corpus or coram nobis for a petitioner who 
is not currently serving a sentence of imprisonment for the 
conviction he wishes to challenge, even if petitioner 
contends that collateral consequences stem from that 
conviction. Accordingly, insofar as state law clearly 
forecloses state court review of Coss' "collateral 
consequence" claim, the District Court properly excused 
exhaustion and entertained the claim on its merit. 7 See, 
e.g., Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 
1986) (citing Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) 
(per curiam)). 
 
V. Applicable Law 
 
Because Coss submitted filings to the District Court both 
before and after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), we think it 
necessary to briefly discuss the law governing this action. 
We conclude that the amendments brought about by 
AEDPA do not apply to this case as Coss' original petition 
and amendment were both filed prior to AEDPA's effective 
date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); 
McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997). Though 
Coss did file a "Second Petition" in November 1996, i.e., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We view Commonwealth v. Ahlborn not as erecting a "procedural bar," 
but as a statement that there is no available state remedy for the claim 
that the present sentence was incorrectly enhanced by an invalid prior 
conviction. 
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after the enactment of AEDPA, that petition did not add 
new claims, but merely waived, as was permitted by the 
District Court's order of October 23, 1996, those claims 
presented in his original petition that were determined by 
the District Court to be unexhausted. See, e.g., Rose, 455 
U.S. at 510 (a petitioner may amend his petition to delete 
unexhausted claims); McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934 
(3d Cir. 1987) (same). 
 
Amendments to applications for writs of habeas corpus 
are statutorily provided for by 28 U.S.C. S 2242, which 
states that such petitions "may be amended or 
supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure 
applicable to civil actions." See Rule 11 of the Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases; see also Calderon v. 
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, -- , 118 S. Ct. 1694, 1700 (1998) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (amendments to habeas petitions 
under Rule 11 are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 unless 
otherwise expressly governed by the statute). In accordance 
with Rule 15(a), a party may amend a pleading after a 
responsive pleading has been served "by leave of court." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Moreover, pursuant to Rule 15(c)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the claim asserted in 
the amended petition "arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrences set forth" in the original 
petition, the amendment of the pleading relates back to the 
date the original petition was filed. As noted previously, the 
claims in Coss' second amended petition not only "arose 
out of the conduct" set forth in the original habeas petition 
and amendment, they were the same claims, minus those 
that were unexhausted. In fairness, we view his petition 
filed after AEDPA as tantamount to a further amendment to 
his initial filing, which he filed at the direction of the 
District Court, expressing Coss' intention to proceed with 
his exhausted claims. Therefore, we view all the claims 
raised as having been asserted in a petition filed prior to 
AEDPA's enactment date. Accordingly, under pre-AEDPA 
habeas requirements, Coss was obligated to obtain a 
certificate of probable cause in order to appeal from the 
District Court's judgment dismissing his habeas corpus 
petition. 
 
The pre-AEDPA certificate of probable cause did not 
require specification of issues and placed the entire case 
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before the court of appeals. See Ramsey v. Bowersox, 149 
F.3d 749, 759 (8th Cir. 1998); Herrera v. United States, 96 
F.3d 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States ex 
rel. Hickey v. Jeffes, 571 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1978). The post- 
AEDPA certificate of appealability, on the other hand, 
requires specification as to which issues satisfy the 
standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2), i.e., those 
issues for which the applicant has made a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. In the 
instant case, rather than granting appellant a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal, the District Court granted Coss 
a certificate of appealability limited to his claim that 
counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by 
failing to subpoena witnesses on the assault charge. Under 
pre-AEDPA law we determined that it is inappropriate for a 
District Court to prescribe the issues or issue which may be 
considered in support of or in opposition to a judgment, 
Hickey, 571 F.2d at 766, and appellant is free to choose 
which claims to assert on appeal. In this case, however, 
because Coss, through his attorney, limited his request for 
a certificate of appealability on appeal to the one issue 
he believed to be of "arguable merit," that is, the 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim at issue, we see no reason 
to extend our review beyond the merits of that claim. 
Moreover, given our disposition of the appeal, we see little 
difference an expanded review would make. 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
At issue is the District Court's application of the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland ineffective assistance of 
counsel test. Since Coss' claim involves the legal 
component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we 
exercise plenary review. See Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 
326, 328 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
In order to obtain relief based on an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, a defendant must not only show that his 
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, but 
also that it prejudiced his case. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 692. The District Court denied 
Coss habeas relief, despite its finding that counsel's failure 
to subpoena the witnesses at issue was objectively 
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unreasonable, because Coss had failed to demonstrate  
prejudice.8 
 
To prove prejudice under the second prong of the 
Strickland test, a defendant must "establish a reasonable 
probability -- one sufficient to undermine our confidence in 
the outcome -- that the jury's verdict would have been 
different if not for counsel's errors." United States v. Gray, 
878 F.2d 702, 712 (3d Cir. 1989). The District Court 
reached its conclusion that Coss had failed to demonstrate 
prejudice based on the fact that the witnesses who testified 
at the evidentiary hearing painted a completely different 
picture of the incident leading to Coss' arrest from that told 
by Coss and Jimmy at trial. The testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing made clear that, on the night of the 
incident, Coss had been drinking at a party that had to be 
broken up by the police. This version of events is a far cry 
from Coss' trial testimony of a calm, quiet evening 
sabotaged by two rogue police officers. Assuming that, 
regardless of counsel's error, Coss still would have testified, 
and would have testified in the way that he did, the District 
Court reasoned that the failure to call these witnesses was 
not prejudicial to Coss, as their testimony, if offered, would 
only have suggested to the jury that Coss was lying on the 
witness stand and that Coss was drunk and excitable 
during the incident. Because this case turned on a 
credibility determination between Coss and the officers, the 
District Court reasoned that Coss could not have been 
prejudiced by counsel's failure to call witnesses who only 
would have contradicted Coss' version of the facts, 
destroying his credibility with the jury.9  The District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We are not asked to review the issue of the reasonableness of 
counsel's actions as justifiable or strategic decisions. Here, Coss' 
attorney claimed no tactical merit to her failures except to say that she 
must have done what Coss wanted in not subpoenaing witnesses; nor 
does the government contest the District Court'sfinding that her 
conduct "fell below objective standards of reasonableness." 
 
9. The District Court also considered that Carol Ann and Bobby's 
testimony would have been suspect since they are Coss' siblings, that 
Sherry's testimony would have been suspect since she was Coss' 
girlfriend, and that George Frieto's testimony, while seemingly beneficial 
to Coss in that he testified that it was he who attacked the officer, is 
also 
not inconsistent with the officer's testimony that an individual named 
George, in addition to Coss, tried to hinder Bobby's arrest. 
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thus concluded that the outcome of the trial would have 
been no different, that is, Coss still would have been found 
guilty of assaulting the officer, absent counsel's failure. 
 
We disagree with the District Court's reasoning. While it 
is unlikely that a court can determine with certainty the 
result of the proceedings absent counsel's error, we must 
examine the "breadth of the evidence" and examine whether 
it is sufficient to undermine our confidence that the case 
would have come out in the way that it did absent counsel's 
errors. United States v. Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 191 (3d 
Cir. 1997). Having examined the breadth of the evidence in 
this case, including the evidentiary hearing transcript, we 
conclude that there is a reasonable probability that, had 
counsel subpoenaed the witnesses at issue, Coss would not 
have been found guilty of assaulting the officer. 
 
As a result of counsel's failure to conduct an 
investigation into the events surrounding Coss' arrest on 
the night of June 25, 1986, only Coss and his younger 
brother Jimmy testified in Coss' defense. It cannot be 
doubted that Coss and Jimmy decided to try to conceal 
what had occurred that evening -- that is, the fact that on 
the night in question they were drinking, underage, at a 
party -- during their testimony. Regardless of Coss' 
motivation to lie about the context of the incident provoking 
his arrest, he and Jimmy testified that Coss did not assault 
a police officer. At the evidentiary hearing held to 
investigate Coss' ineffective counsel claims, Carol Ann, 
Bobby, Sherry, and George all testified that there was a 
party at Carol Ann's house, that the people at the party 
were consuming alcohol, that a fight broke out, and that 
the police came to break up the fight. Most importantly, 
however, Carol Ann, Bobby, Sherry, and George testified 
consistently that Coss did not punch a police officer, and 
Bobby, Sherry, and George testified consistently that 
George jumped on a police officer's back when the officer 
assaulted Bobby. Finally, they also testified consistently 
that, at the time the officers arrested Bobby, which, 
according to the officers, is the time that Coss punched the 
officer, Coss was sitting in the police car with the door shut.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. It is important to note that all witnesses at the evidentiary hearing 
were sequestered, thus bolstering the credibility of these witnesses' 
convincingly consistent versions of the critical events. 
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Thus, although the witnesses' rendition of what happened 
on the night in question conflicts in large part with Coss' 
original version of the story, all accounts of the evening are 
consistent in their most significant respect, the fact that 
Coss did not commit the assault alleged. 
 
In our view, the District Court employed too narrow an 
approach in analyzing Coss' claim of prejudice. When it 
reached the prejudice prong of the Strickland  test, the 
District Court stated that " `[p]rejudice' to a defendant from 
the failure to call witnesses should be assessed in the 
context of the other testimony presented by the defense 
witnesses." Dist. Ct. Op. at 18 (June 10, 1998) (emphasis 
added). The District Court then asked whether the result of 
this trial would have been any different if, instead of only 
Coss and Jimmy testifying in Coss' defense, Coss, Jimmy, 
and the other four witnesses had testified in Coss' defense, 
assuming not only that Coss would still testify, but would 
tell the tale that he did at trial. 
 
Strickland requires that a court consider"the totality of 
the evidence before the judge or jury" in determining 
prejudice. 466 U.S. at 695. It does not require, however, the 
court to ignore the way in which the "totality" would 
present itself if counsel's conduct had been objectively 
reasonable. Strickland also recognizes that some errors are 
so great that a court cannot merely recall the proceedings 
as they occurred with counsel's error, and then, as the 
District Court did here, merely add the evidence not 
presented to determine the alternative outcome of the trial 
absent counsel's mistake. "Some errors will have had a 
pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some 
will have had an isolated, trivial effect." Id. at 696-97. 
 
Here, counsel's error had a pervasive effect, altering the 
entire evidentiary picture at trial. The testimony of the 
witnesses not presented should not be considered as merely 
a hypothetical supplement to the evidence offered, with the 
remainder of the trial presumed to unfold as it actually did. 
Considering the totality of the evidence, we believe that, 
had counsel subpoenaed the witnesses and heard from 
them their version of the events, including the fact that, 
although the police were partially correct in their 
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allegations, it was George, not Coss, who assaulted the 
officer, she would not have presented at trial all versions of 
the evening's events, including Coss' clearly fictional 
rendition. When we assume the reasonably probable 
outcome without counsel's ineffectiveness, we must also 
assume a scenario that envisions counsel's acting  
effectively.11 The District Court should have realized and 
considered the different course that the trial would 
probably have taken had counsel acted in an objectively 
reasonable manner by subpoenaing and interviewing these 
witnesses, and then presenting a defense consistent with 
their testimony. If counsel had interviewed these witnesses, 
we believe that there is a reasonable probability that Coss 
would not have testified at all, or that Coss would have 
testified consistently with the other witnesses, thus 
avoiding the contradictory testimony that troubled the 
District Court. 
 
We also note that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has provided additional insight into the "outcome" test, 
which suggests that, in determining whether a defendant 
was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness, we should also 
inquire whether counsel's conduct rendered the verdict 
"unreliable." Because the outcome test can produce 
untoward results depending on the facts, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that the prejudice inquiry, at its 
core, involves concepts of reliability and fairness. In 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), the Supreme 
Court was faced with the question of "whether counsel's 
failure to make an objection in a state criminal sentencing 
proceeding -- an objection that would have been supported 
by a decision which subsequently was overruled -- 
constitutes `prejudice' " under Strickland. 506 U.S. at 366. 
The court of appeals, in a divided opinion, had upheld 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In fact, as pointed out by appellant, if counsel had put both Coss 
and the witnesses at issue on the stand and presented an inconsistent 
theory of defense, that in itself could constitute ineffective assistance. 
See Bland v. California Dept. of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir. 
1994). Of course, counsel cannot rely on Bland to say that it was proper 
for her not to offer the witnesses' testimony in her attempt to present a 
consistent theory of defense, since she did not interview these witnesses 
to know of any inconsistency. 
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defendant's ineffective counsel claim, even though it had 
two years earlier overruled the decision that was the basis 
for defendant's ineffectiveness claim; thus, the omitted 
objection that was the basis of counsel's alleged 
ineffectiveness would have been overruled under current 
law.12 Fretwell v. Lockhart , 946 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1991), 
rev'd, 506 U.S. 364 (1993). The majority reasoned that 
defendant was entitled to the circuit's case law that was in 
effect at the time of his sentencing because, if counsel had 
made the objection at issue at that time, the trial court 
would have had to sustain it and the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different. Id. at 577. The 
Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating that the 
prejudice component of the Strickland test focuses not just 
on whether the outcome of a proceeding would have been 
different but for counsel's ineffectiveness, but on"whether 
counsel's deficient performance renders the result of the 
trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair." 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372. "Unreliability or unfairness does 
not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive 
the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to 
which the law entitles him." Id. The Court concluded that, 
despite the fact that defendant was not reaping the benefit 
of the law in effect at the time of his sentencing, since 
current case law held that a defendant was not entitled to 
the particular objection at issue, defendant had not been 
denied any substantive or procedural right to which the law 
entitles him and "[t]he result of the sentencing proceeding 
in the present case was neither unfair nor unreliable." Id. 
at 371. In so honing and clarifying the prejudice test, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Defendant argued that his counsel should have made an objection 
based on Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
a death sentence is unconstitutional if it is based on an aggravating 
factor that duplicates an element of the underlying felony). The Eighth 
Circuit overruled Collins in light of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (holding that a death sentence 
was not invalid on the ground that the sole aggravating circumstance 
found by the jury was identical to an element of the capital crime of 
which defendant was convicted). See Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 
(8th Cir. 1989) (overruling Collins in light of Lowenfield). 
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court harkened back to similar reasoning in Nix v. 
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).13 
 
While in both Nix v. Whiteside and Lockhart v. Fretwell 
the application of concepts of reliability and fairness caused 
the court to conclude that a defendant was not prejudiced 
even though the outcome would have been different absent 
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, we find the reasoning of 
these opinions to be helpful nonetheless here, where in the 
process of examining the probable effect of counsel's error, 
the District Court did not consider whether the proceeding 
reached an unreliable, unfair result. See Fretwell, 946 F.2d 
at 579 (dissenting opinion). 
 
Our analysis of this aspect of the second prong of 
Strickland is not unlike our ruling in Kauffman, 109 F.3d 
186, in which we held that defense counsel was ineffective 
for failing to investigate an insanity defense for a defendant 
when counsel had received a letter from a doctor 
supporting such a defense. Counsel claimed that he did not 
pursue this defense, and instead encouraged his client to 
plead guilty, because he viewed the insanity defense as 
inconsistent with defendant's conduct that demonstrated 
that he knew and appreciated the criminal nature of his 
acts. The district court had found no ineffectiveness and no 
prejudice because it concluded that the outcome would 
probably have been the same -- Kauffman would have been 
found guilty -- with or without counsel's alleged 
ineffectiveness. On appeal, however, we noted that"the 
breadth of the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. In Nix v. Whiteside, the defendant argued that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his counsel refused to aid him in 
presenting perjured testimony. Although it seems likely that such 
conduct on the part of counsel could have an effect on the trial's 
outcome, the Court held as a matter of law that "counsel's conduct 
complained of here cannot establish the prejudice required for relief 
under the second strand of the Strickland inquiry." Nix, 475 U.S. at 175. 
The Court reasoned that, under Strickland, the "benchmark" of an 
ineffective-assistance claim is the fairness and reliability of the 
adversary 
proceeding, and that "[w]hether he was persuaded or compelled to desist 
from perjury, Whiteside has no valid claim that confidence in the result 
of his trial has been diminished by his desisting from the contemplated 
perjury." Id. 
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is sufficient to undermine our confidence that Zorbaugh 
would have advised his client to plead guilty rather than 
proceed to trial and that Kauffman would have accepted 
that advice." Id. at 191. Defendant was prejudiced by 
counsel's conduct because there was a reasonable 
probability "that the outcome of these proceedings would 
have been different had his counsel not failed in this duty 
to investigate the evidence obtainable from various health 
professionals." Id. In essence, we used our own skepticism 
regarding the reliability and fairness of the result to inform 
our determination as to the outcome. 
 
While we do not wish to overstate the applicability of Nix 
and Fretwell to the instant situation -- since they are 
clearly distinguishable -- nevertheless, they act as a 
reminder that the concept of reliability and fairness should 
serve as a guide as we make the prejudice determination. 
In determining whether there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome would have been different absent 
counsel's ineffectiveness, the district court should look at 
whether the outcome that did occur was reliable and fair in 
light of all the evidence before it. In Kauffman, that 
evidence demonstrated that the defendant may well have 
been totally psychotic and therefore not guilty; similarly, 
here, that evidence tended to show that Coss was innocent 
of the assault charge. The results reached in the trial were 
unreliable and the outcome, had counsel been effective, 
may well have been different. We think that it is helpful to 
consider the reliability and fairness of the result reached as 
an aid to reaching the appropriate conclusion as to the 
probable outcome had counsel's ineffectiveness not been a 
factor. 
 
Thus, we believe that counsel's failure to subpoena these 
witnesses who would have all testified as to Coss' innocence 
as to the simple assault renders the District Court's view 
that the outcome of the trial would have been the same 
with or without these witnesses to be flawed. In light of the 
amount of exculpatory evidence that was in fact available, 
yet not presented to the jury, we believe that counsel's 
conduct made the result of Coss' trial fundamentally unfair 
and unreliable, and the outcome would have likely been 
different if the witnesses had been called. Thus, Coss has 
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met his burden under Strickland, and subsequent Supreme 
Court case law clarifying Strickland, to prove that he was 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to subpoena the 
witnesses at issue. 
 
VII. Relief 
 
Having determined that Coss' conviction for assault is 
constitutionally defective, we must determine what habeas 
relief should be afforded to him. We would normally 
remand this issue for determination by the District Court, 
but due to our concern for the defendant's continued 
confinement based on an unconstitutional conviction -- 
assuming the assault conviction did in fact play a role in 
enhancing the sentence he now serves -- and because the 
issue is one that has not previously received specific 
attention in the courts, we will determine the relief we will 
provide, requiring that the writ be conditioned as we deem 
appropriate. 
 
We must decide between the two apparent choices for 
relief: condition the writ on the state's granting Coss a 
retrial on the 1986 assault charge and, if the result of the 
retrial differs from the previous result, a subsequent 
resentencing on Coss' current conviction, removing from 
Coss' current sentence any enhancement based on the 
prior unconstitutional conviction; or, condition the writ on 
the state's resentencing of Coss for his current conviction 
without any enhancement due to the prior unconstitutional 
conviction.14 While a retrial is the usual relief granted in a 
habeas proceeding based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel in connection with a current conviction, the 
Supreme Court precedent has required only resentencing 
absent consideration of the prior, unconstitutional 
conviction as the proper relief in this situation. See Tucker, 
404 U.S. 443. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude 
that the proper relief under these circumstances is the 
latter of these two options, resentencing absent 
consideration of the unconstitutional conviction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In his various habeas petitions, Coss has consistently sought a new 
trial and a new sentencing hearing. 
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The writ of habeas corpus is a civil remedy against 
unconstitutional confinement. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 
391, 423-24 (1963). It is not "a stage of the state criminal 
proceedings" or "an appeal therefrom." Id. at 424. Thus, in 
an important way, habeas proceedings are independent 
from the criminal proceedings that have already occurred, 
serving only to judge and to correct that which results in 
unconstitutional confinement. In many cases, the issue of 
unconstitutional confinement is unrelated to the question 
of guilt or innocence. It may, as in the case at hand, relate 
to a current sentence that has been enhanced by an 
expired, yet unconstitutional conviction. A sentence which 
is enhanced based on a prior unconstitutional conviction, 
although appearing more attenuated from the actual wrong 
than a person's incarceration following an unconstitutional 
trial, is nonetheless unconstitutional confinement and must 
be corrected. See Tucker, 404 U.S. at 449. 
 
We are guided by the Supreme Court decision in Tucker 
in which, as here, the Court granted habeas relief based on 
a prior conviction that had been served in full, but that had 
an enhancement effect on the petitioner's current sentence. 
The Court found the petitioner's current confinement 
unconstitutional because it was based, in part, on a prior 
conviction resulting from a trial at which he was denied his 
constitutional right to counsel. Without any consideration 
of the petitioner's probable guilt or innocence as to the 
prior offense, the Court ordered the writ conditioned upon 
petitioner's resentencing absent any consideration of the 
prior, unconstitutional conviction. Since the prior 
conviction was found unconstitutional, it could have no 
impact on the petitioner's current sentence. See id. at 447- 
48 (stating that the real question is not whether the 
outcome of the earlier prosecutions would have been 
different if Tucker had counsel, "but whether the sentence 
. . . might have been different if the sentencing judge had 
known that at least two of [Tucker's] previous convictions 
had been unconstitutionally obtained"). 
 
In Maleng v. Cook, the Court was faced with the issue of 
whether the petitioner was "in custody" in order to confer 
habeas jurisdiction such that the petitioner could challenge 
his sentence, enhanced by an allegedly unconstitutional, 
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expired conviction. The Court limited itself to the narrow 
issue of custody, but expressly recognized the possibility of 
challenging an expired conviction in connection with an 
attack on a current sentence enhanced by the prior 
conviction. In this case, however, unlike Tucker, the prior 
conviction was challenged based on the court's failure to 
hold a competency hearing. 
 
We have since applied the reasoning in Tucker and 
Maleng, holding in Clark v. Commonwealth, 892 F.2d 1142 
(3d Cir. 1989), that habeas relief was available to a 
petitioner whose current sentence was based in part on 
prior convictions tainted by the denial of his constitutional 
right to due process. Consistent with the relief granted in 
Tucker, we granted the petitioner's writ conditioned on 
resentencing for the subsequent offense absent 
consideration of the prior conviction. Id. at 1149 n.10 
(stating that the only relief available under Tucker is 
resentencing). In Young v. Vaughn, we again applied the 
reasoning of Tucker, holding that the petitioner could 
challenge his prior conviction, held unconstitutional due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel, if this conviction was used 
to enhance his current sentence.15 Since in Young we were 
addressing only our jurisdiction to hear the habeas 
petition, we did not specifically consider what relief was 
appropriate if the petition was successful. 
 
We see no meaningful distinction between Tucker and its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Other courts have also recognized this type of collateral 
consequences relief and have held, consistent with our decisions in Clark 
and Young, that complete denial of right to counsel, as in Tucker, is not 
the only constitutional violation justifying such relief. See, e.g., Brock 
v. 
Weston, 31 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 1994) (prior conviction challenged based 
on involuntary and uninformed plea); Tredway v. Farley, 35 F.3d 288 
(7th Cir. 1994) (prior conviction challenged based on involuntary guilty 
plea); Allen v. Collins, 924 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1991) (prior conviction 
challenged based on ineffective assistance of counsel); Battle v. Thomas, 
923 F.2d 165 (11th Cir. 1991) (prior conviction challenged based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel); Gamble v. Parsons, 898 F.2d 117 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (prior conviction challenged based on involuntary and 
uninformed guilty pleas); Taylor v. Armontrout, 877 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 
1989) (prior conviction challenged based on involuntary guilty plea and 
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal). 
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progeny and the case at hand to cause the relief in this 
case to be any different from that granted in Tucker. Both 
unconstitutional convictions, although expired, provided 
grounds for habeas relief because they resulted in the 
petitioners' serving sentences enhanced thereby, and were, 
thus, unconstitutional. Just as in Tucker, we cannot now 
correct by retrial the unconstitutional incarceration 
resulting from the previous conviction, as that sentence has 
been served in its entirety. Instead, all that we can do is 
provide the state court with the opportunity to void Coss' 
current sentence of the ramifications, if any, resulting from 
the prior unconstitutional conviction. 
 
Conditioning the writ on resentencing is consistent with 
the mandate in Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 
1988). In Barry, we warned that "[a] habeas court does not 
have power to directly intervene in the process of the 
tribunal which has incorrectly subjected the petitioner to 
the custody of the respondent official. . . . The respect due 
the tribunals of a sovereign state within our federal system, 
however, requires that its courts be given an opportunity to 
correct their own errors." In this case, we will give the 
tribunal which incorrectly subjected him to custody-- 
namely, the sentencing court -- the opportunity to correct 
its error by resentencing Coss, ridding his sentence of the 
unconstitutional taint of his prior conviction. 
 
We realize that the sentencing court must now assess the 
extent to which the unconstitutional conviction impacted 
the sentence it handed down and resentence without 
including the prior offense in its thinking. While this may 
leave an open issue as to Coss' guilt or innocence of the 
assault, guilt or innocence is not our charge.16 See Herrera 
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (stating that "federal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. It might even be said that our determination here is more probative 
of Coss' actual guilt or innocence of the assault charge than was the 
determination in Tucker. Here, we determine not only that counsel was 
ineffective, but, in determining prejudice, we held that there was a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of Coss' trial would have been 
different such that Coss may well have been found not guilty. No such 
finding was required with the invalid conviction in Tucker, where we 
know little as to his actual commission or guilt of the offense, but 
prohibited its consideration because of its blatant unconstitutionality. 
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habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not 
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution -- not to correct 
errors of fact"); Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447-48 ("We need not 
speculate about whether the outcome of the respondent's 
. . . prosecutions would necessarily have been different if he 
had had the help of a lawyer."); S. Rep. No. 80-1526, at 2 
(1948) ("[H]abeas corpus . . . is not a determination of guilt 
or innocence of the charge upon which petitioner was 
sentenced. Where a prisoner sustains his right to discharge 
in habeas corpus, it is usually because some right .. . has 
been denied which reflects no determination of his guilt or 
innocence but affects solely the fairness of his earlier 
criminal trial.").17 Habeas relief serves to rectify conditions 
of unconstitutional confinement. Coss is no longer confined 
for the previous assault conviction. Thus, we are to rid 
Coss' current confinement of its constitutional defect -- 
which the reliance upon his previous conviction represents. 
Doing any more than this oversteps the bounds of our task 
on habeas review.18 
 
Further, while re-trying Coss' assault would make 
resentencing fully informed, we think this inappropriate 
given our limited role in applying habeas relief, as a retrial 
would have the untoward result of providing Coss with a 
method of attacking, and altering, the outcome of his 
assault trial in a way otherwise unavailable to him through 
direct and collateral review absent this second conviction.19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In fact, the actual innocence inquiry most often comes into play in 
habeas proceedings where a petitioner seeking relief on a potentially 
meritorious constitutional claim faces an otherwise dispositive 
procedural bar to review or relief. In these cases, the petitioner must 
proffer a colorable claim of innocence to defeat the bar. See Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). 
 
18. We have explained previously that federal courts walk a fine line in 
fashioning the appropriate relief on habeas review. See Henderson v. 
Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that the condition 
upon which the writ is issued must be fitted between two principles: 
minimizing intervention into the state criminal process and ensuring the 
cure of all constitutional defects). 
 
19. Actually, Coss did present his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
in a collateral challenge to his 1986 convictionfiled pursuant to 
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act. This petition, which served 
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It is one thing to enable a petitioner to attack the 
constitutionality of a prior conviction insofar as it impacts 
a later sentence; it is quite another to let him reach back 
and undo that conviction after the opportunity for 
challenging it on direct appeal and collateral proceedings 
has come and gone. The concept of challenging previous 
convictions as enhancers is a novel use of habeas; we 
should not let it bring about untoward results. See Alan C. 
Smith, Note, More Than a Question of Forum: The Use of 
Unconstitutional Convictions to Enhance Sentences Following 
Custis v. United States, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1323, 1340 (1995) 
(stating that "the language in Maleng indicates the Court's 
reluctance to let defendants challenge prior convictions in 
the federal habeas forum" and that the "reasoning in Custis 
regarding the importance of finality and the difficulty of 
administering attacks on prior convictions also reveal[s] a 
desire to severely limit these claims"). 
 
Our view that resentencing on the more recent conviction 
is warranted, rather than a new trial on his 1986 assault 
charge, is also consistent with language in other case law 
discussing this unique habeas posture. While Tucker 
appears to be our sole guide as to the conditional relief 
appropriate in these circumstances, the developing 
jurisprudence focusing on these unique circumstances is 
consistent in noting that we are not attacking the expired 
conviction directly. Instead, the prior conviction may only 
be attacked in the "context of " the current sentence. Young, 
83 F.3d at 78 (specifying that a defendant may only attack 
a prior conviction "in the context of a challenge to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
as justification for the District Court to excuse the exhaustion 
requirement, has yet to be acted upon by the state courts. While Coss' 
petition remains pending, in all likelihood the state courts would refuse 
to entertain it at this late date. See, e.g., Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720 
(stating that collateral relief is not available for a petitioner who is 
not 
currently serving a sentence of imprisonment for the conviction he 
wishes to challenge, even if collateral consequences stem from that 
conviction). Nonetheless, our resolution of Coss' habeas claim, and part 
of our rationale for declining to find that a new trial would be the 
appropriate relief here, stems from the fact that doing so would make 
this type of challenge available even if Coss had not raised this issue in 
connection with the review of his 1986 conviction. 
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enhanced sentence for which he is in custody"); Gamble, 
898 F.2d at 118 (interpreting Maleng as precluding a 
defendant from challenging an expired conviction "directly," 
but stating that a defendant may attack a prior 
unconstitutional conviction in the context of its effect on a 
present sentence); Taylor, 877 F.2d at 727 (same); see also 
Crank v. Duckworth, 905 F.2d 1090, 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) 
("That a person happens to be in custody is of course not 
a sufficient reason to rummage through old judgments in 
search of ones that may be invalid. To obtain relief under 
S 2254 the prisoner must show that his current 
confinement violates the Constitution.").20 It is in the 
context of his current sentence that Coss has attacked the 
previous conviction, and it is in that context, and limited to 
that context, that we will require habeas relief to be 
afforded to him. 
 
Accordingly, we order that a writ shall issue conditioned 
upon Coss' being resentenced without consideration of the 
previous assault conviction. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the District 
Court's denial of Coss' habeas petition and remand to the 
District Court with instructions that it order a writ of 
habeas corpus to issue conditioned upon Coss' being 
resentenced without consideration of the previous assault 
conviction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. We do not read Brock v. Weston, which did not expressly limit the 
condition of the writ on the petitioner's resentencing, but rather ordered 
the district court "to resolve the petitioner's challenge to [the prior] 
conviction," as inconsistent with our holding here. Instead, we interpret 
Brock as an order to rid the petitioner's current sentence of any 
ramifications from his prior unconstitutional conviction, not as an order 
to retry the petitioner on the expired conviction. 
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
Several important public policy and social welfare 
considerations divide the panel in this case, the facts of 
which, at first blush, seem very pedestrian, yet the grant of 
habeas corpus relief presents an extremely important 
question that goes to the heart of comity in the relationship 
of federal courts and state sovereignties in habeas corpus 
cases brought under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. In granting the writ, 
the majority denies the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania the 
option of correcting the constitutional infirmity of 
incompetency of counsel by means of new trial. I disagree 
with this result. 
 
I adhere to the long line of cases in this court that 
typically condition the grant of the writ under S 2254 on 
allowing the state the option, where it is possible, to cure 
the constitutional infirmity. My experience in this court's 
tradition goes back 31 years when I wrote the court's 
opinion in United States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 
790 (3d Cir. 1968), a Pennsylvania murder case in which 
we determined that the guilty plea was constitutionally 
infirm.1 
 
The precise issue that occupies our attention was not 
raised by the parties, but rather was injected by the 
majority without briefing or argument. Indeed, Coss did not 
even request the relief he is now receiving. In his Second 
Amended Habeas Corpus Petition, drafted by counsel, Coss 
simply sought a new trial of his 1986 conviction. See Joint 
App. at 19 P 4 ("The above stated issues are meritorious 
and demonstrate that Coss was denied his due process 
right to a fair sentencing hearing and his Sixth (6th) 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Thus, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Therein we stated: 
 
       Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the court below and remand 
       the case with the direction that the district court issue a writ of 
       habeas corpus without prejudice to the right of the Commonwealth 
       of Pennsylvania to undertake appropriate action in the further 
       prosecution of this matter. 
 
404 F.2d at 802. 
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Coss is entitled to a new trial and sentencing hearing with 
regard to his institutional vandalism, criminal mischief, and 
simple assault convictions."). 
 
I. 
 
This melancholy chronicle of events started with a simple 
assault and battery that took place on June 25, 1986, in 
the small city of Dickson in Lackawanna County, 
Pennsylvania, when the local police were called to a high 
school graduation party at the home of Carol Ann Frank, 
the sister of the then-17 year old Appellant, Edward Coss. 
It seems that Carol Ann's roommate, one Lisa Frieto, got 
into a hair pulling contest with another party goer, one 
Sherry Kulick, and thereafter the revelers, all of whom were 
juiced up, apparently picked sides and a grand donnybrook 
was had by all until Carol Ann, the hostess, a real party- 
pooper, threw everyone out of her house. 
 
Undeterred by the great outdoors, the donnybrookers 
continued their carousing outside until the landlord and 
the neighbors called the police. When the cops arrived with 
their usual greeting, "Break it up," there apparently was a 
slight problem in attitude adjustment, and the cops say 
that Coss threw a couple of punches at one of them, which 
landed Coss in the local lockup. Totally dissatisfied with the 
accommodations, Coss proceeded to voice his complaint by 
destroying a radiator, a sink, a toilet and a lightfixture on 
the ceiling in his cell. For this, he was convicted of simple 
assault and institutional vandalism and sentenced to six 
months to a year on each offense. Coss did his time and 
was released to society on parole. 
 
Seven or eight months after Coss was discharged from 
Pennsylvania parole supervision on August 30, 1989, a 
certain Peter Petrovich was beaten "by a group offive or six 
men, including appellant,"2 and Coss was arrested and 
convicted on one count of aggravated assault and battery 
and one count of simple assault for his part in the group 
effort to register displeasure on Petrovich's person. Coss 
was sentenced to a term of six to twelve years 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See Commonwealth v. Coss, 695 A.2d 831, 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
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imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction and 
there is no question that the sentencing judge took into 
consideration his previous conviction of assault and 
battery. 
 
II. 
 
The panel is in agreement that a Sixth Amendment 
deprivation of competent counsel infected the trial for the 
1986 offense. We have federal habeas corpus subject 
matter jurisdiction to reach this conclusion under 28 
U.S.C. S 2254, even though Coss is no longer "in custody" 
for that offense--no longer imprisoned or on parole-- 
because of the teachings of Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 
(1989) (per curiam), Clark v. Commonwealth, 892 F.2d 1142 
(3d Cir. 1989), and Young v. Vaughn, 83 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
The majority's approach requires us to assess the rights 
of society as against the rights of the criminal following a 
determination that the criminal is in custody for a sentence 
that has been tainted by a constitutionally infirm 
conviction, for which the criminal is no longer in custody. 
The normal relief that we grant in habeas corpus is to order 
that the habeas petitioner be freed, subject to the right of 
society to correct in a timely manner the constitutional 
error through a new state proceeding. It cannot be 
controverted that had Coss filed his habeas petition during 
the period he was incarcerated or on parole from thefirst 
conviction and we decided that he had been deprived of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, we would have accorded 
Pennsylvania the option of releasing him or correcting the 
infirmity by means of a new trial or other proceedings. See, 
e.g., Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
Here, however, we cannot "free" Coss because he has 
already, in the vernacular, "done the crime and done the 
time." We are thus faced with the very nice question: 
Should we give society, here, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, the right to cure the Sixth Amendment 
constitutional defect or should we give the Appellant a free 
ride and have his second sentence declared invalid simply 
because he is a recidivist? 
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I think that the state body politic should always have the 
right to cure the constitutional defect of a conviction used 
to enhance a sentence on a later conviction (1) if the federal 
court has the jurisdiction to confer that option upon the 
state and (2) if it is at all possible by means of new state 
proceedings. The cases relied upon by the majority to 
support its grant of extraordinary relief are exceptions to 
this well-reasoned rule based on the inability of the federal 
courts to direct new state court proceedings. The 
circumstances present here fall squarely within our 
traditional procedures. To follow the course set by the 
majority, therefore, improperly infringes on state 
sovereignty and on the notions of federalism, comity and 
fairness that underlie the habeas corpus framework. 
 
In Henderson, supra, we explained that "federal habeas 
power is limited, first, to a determination of whether there 
has been an improper detention by virtue of the state court 
judgment; and second, if we find such an illegal detention, 
to ordering the immediate release of the prisoner, 
conditioned on the state's opportunity to correct 
constitutional errors that we conclude occurred in the 
initial proceedings." 155 F.3d at 168. 
 
It must be asked why, in light of our clear discussion 
in Henderson, the majority seeks to deprive the 
Commonwealth of the option of correcting the 
constitutional violation by a new trial on simple assault. 
The majority's primary answer is a reliance on United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). Let's examine that 
case. 
 
A. 
 
The teachings of Tucker do not constitute an appropriate 
analogue to this case or any other federal habeas case 
brought under S 2254. United States v. Tucker by caption 
and by content was not a habeas corpus case brought 
under S 2254 based on a state conviction; the defendant 
there was seeking post conviction relief from a federal 
conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. This is a 
distinction with a fundamental difference. The Court could 
not possibly condition relief on affording any state the 
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opportunity to retry the defendant because no state officials 
were parties to the law suit. No state warden, no custodian, 
no state officers were respondents or defendants as in the 
case of a S 2254 petition. In bringing his action, Tucker was 
attacking a federal sentence imposed by the District Court 
for the Northern District of California that had been 
enhanced on the basis of invalid state court convictions 
from Florida and Louisiana. Because the Court had no 
state officers as petitioners or respondents before it, the 
Court lacked power or authority to give the option to a state 
court in Florida or Louisiana to retry the defendant. To 
prevent the "erosion of the Gideon principle" that the right 
to effective assistance of counsel is fundamental, the Court 
had no alternative other than to order that the defendant 
be resentenced on the federal conviction without reference 
to the invalid state court convictions.3  In contrast, in every 
habeas petition brought under S2254, an officer of the state 
or a political subdivision thereof is always the respondent. 
 
The teachings of Tucker reflect one exception to the 
general rule of permitting the state to correct the 
constitutional infirmity in a subsequent sentence 
enhancement case--where the federal court lacks the 
authority to afford the state the opportunity to correct the 
constitutional infirmity because no state officer is a party to 
the litigation. We now turn to another exception reflected in 
the cases. 
 
B. 
 
This court has held, and properly so, that where it is 
factually impossible for the constitutional infirmity to be 
cured by additional state proceedings, the federal court in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Court's discussion is specifically targeted to a S 2255 case: 
 
       [T]he real question here is not whether the results of the Florida 
and 
       Louisiana proceedings might have been different if the respondent 
       had counsel, but whether the sentence in the 1953 federal case 
       might have been different if the sentencing judge had known that at 
       least two of the respondent's previous convictions had been 
       unconstitutionally obtained. 
 
404 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). 
 
                                30 
  
a S 2254 case may simply order resentencing on the 
subsequent conviction without considering a previous 
constitutionally infirm conviction. See Clark v. 
Commonwealth, 892 F.2d 1142 (3d Cir. 1989). Clark was a 
deprivation of due process case lodged against a prior 
conviction that served to enhance the sentence for a 
subsequent offense. The gravamen of the petitioner's 
complaint was that in 1974, when Clark was 17 years of 
age, he was denied a juvenile court hearing to determine 
whether he should have been tried as a juvenile or as an 
adult. At the time we heard this appeal in 1989, the 
petitioner was 31 years old. Accordingly, we could not give 
the Commonwealth the option of providing Clark a juvenile 
court hearing. The only relief possible was to order a 
resentencing on the subsequent conviction without 
enhancement. Thus, Clark reflects at least a second 
exception to the general rule permitting the state to exercise 
the option of additional proceedings, to-wit, where it is 
factually impossible for the state to cure the constitutional 
defect. 
 
III. 
 
We must then determine what dictates of public policy or 
social welfare, or what directive force of law--philosophy, 
history or custom--exists to deny the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania this same option merely because Coss 
committed another crime and was incarcerated again. To be 
sure, we have concentrated our federal habeas corpus 
jurisprudence on the rights of the criminal, but this does 
not mean that federal judges are at liberty to ignore or 
totally disregard the rights of society. The great Cardozo 
taught us: 
 
       The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule 
       that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its 
       existence. "Ethical considerations can no more be 
       excluded from the administration of justice which is 
       the end and purpose of all civil laws than one can 
       exclude the vital air from his room and live.". .. [W]hen 
       [judges] are called upon to say how far existing rules 
       are to be extended or restricted, they must let the 
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       welfare of society fix the path, its direction and its 
       distance.4 
 
Drawing the line between individual liberties and rights, 
and society's rights reflected by government action for the 
larger good, is still the perpetual question of constitutional 
law and is the precise issue that faces this panel today. 
Two thousand years before the Constitution was ratified, 
the same problem bothered an ancient social order that 
spoke through Heraclitus: "The major problem of human 
society is to combine that degree of liberty without which 
law is tyranny, with that degree of law without which 
liberty becomes license."5 
 
Were we simply deciding a case that involved one young 
man who had difficulty in the past controlling his urge to 
punch people and tear out fixtures in a jail cell, and were 
we to be limited to the facts of this case where, more 
probably than not, the District Attorney of Lackawanna 
County likely will not be inclined to commit the resources 
of his office to retry a simple assault and battery case that 
occurred thirteen years ago, I do not think that this case 
would be important at all. 
 
But we must realize that the holding of this case will 
have a profound effect that far transcends the mundane 
facts before us here and the question of whether we have 
jurisdiction to consider Coss' appeal in the first place; and 
that is the whisper of Immanuel Kant behind the ear of 
every appellate judge reminding us of his famed categorical 
imperative: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to 
become through your will a universal law of nature."6 Two 
centuries later, an elaboration on the basic theme was 
uttered: "Judges must decide all the issues in a case on the 
basis of general principles that have legal relevance; the 
principles must be ones the judges would be willing to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 66-67 (1921) 
(footnote omitted). 
 
5. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process: Text, Materials and 
Cases 9 (2d ed. 1996). 
 
6. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 89 (Paton trans. 
1964) (1785). 
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apply to the other situations that they reach; and the 
opinion justifying the decision should contain a full 
statement of those principles."7 This is the concept that 
undergirds the common law doctrine of precedent: The legal 
rule announced in a reported case of an appellate court will 
be applied in subsequent cases presenting the identical 
facts or materially similar ones. 
 
The majority's holding today is not designed to meet the 
fugitive exigencies of the hour. Rather, this court is issuing 
a reward to every recidivist criminal. If you come to federal 
court during your actual first custody, you will not 
automatically be set free; the state will be given an 
opportunity to correct the constitutional infirmity, usually 
by means of a new trial, some new proceeding or new 
appeal. But if you wait to file a habeas challenge of the 
previous conviction until after you commit another criminal 
act and are sent to jail, the possibilities are so much more 
palatable, for if you are successful, the body politic does 
not have the right to correct the original infirmity; 
automatically, you get the benefit of a resentencing on the 
second case as if the constitutional infirmity was 
metaphysically impossible for the state to correct. When 
you wait until the second offense, Mr. Recidivist Criminal, 
and the habeas court finds an infirmity in thatfirst 
conviction, you can thumb your nose to society,"Heads I 
win, tails you lose." Or in the lingo of the jailhouse lawyers, 
"Pal, you're gonna get a free pass." 
 
If we are to weigh the various claims, wants and 
demands asserted on the one hand by the misdemeanant 
or recidivist and on the other hand by society, the law 
requires adjustments or compromises of conflicting 
interests. To do this, we turn to some social interest, 
frequently under the name of public policy, to determine 
the limits of reasonable adjustment. We have been taught 
that a primary social interest is in the general security, long 
recognized in the maxim that the safety of the people is the 
highest law. An equally primary social interest is in the life 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. K. Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 
Colum. L. Rev. 982, 990 (1978), commenting on  H. Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959). 
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and freedom of the individual. They are on a collision 
course here, as Heraclitus explained a millennium or two 
ago, but I feel that if we look at law functionally as an 
attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize,"to adjust 
these overlapping and often conflicting claims and  
demands,"8 the balance must be struck here in favor of the 
Commonwealth, which should be given the opportunity to 
correct the constitutional infirmity that we have found here. 
 
It is for the foregoing reasons that I dissent in part and 
would grant the writ of habeas corpus conditioned on the 
right of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to correct the 
constitutional infirmity by retrying Coss on the 1986 
incident. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 39 
(1943). 
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